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INTRODUCTION 
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Holy Defense, 
also known as the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), was 
a titanic struggle pitting Iran’s revolutionary regime 
and its Islamic values against not only Iraqi dictator 
Saddam Hussein, but more ominously the United 
States and the forces of Western imperialism. From 
the Islamic Republic’s perspective, it won the war 
by marshaling its economic and military resources, 
repulsing the Western- and Gulf Arab-backed 
Iraqi invader from its soil, and showing the world 
that its revolution and Islamic values could not be 
vanquished by economic pressure and force of arms. 
As war veterans returned from the front, however, 
they soon found the very revolution and Islamic 
values they had fought for under attack. The enemy’s 
weapons were no longer economic sanctions and 
high-tech arms, but rather culture and political 
ideals. The enemy’s targets were no longer economic 
or military, but the hearts and minds of the Iranian 
people, especially the youth. The Islamic Republic, 
particularly the conservative political current who 
would come to control most elected and unelected 
centers of power in post-war Iran, struggled to find 
a language to articulate the nature of this ephemeral 
threat, alternatively calling it a “cultural assault,” 
“cultural night-raid,” and “cultural NATO,” among 
other things. By the late 2000s, Iranian Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian 
conservatives had converged on a single term for this 
conflict: “soft war” (jang-e narm).
What is soft war? While the term is sometimes used 
loosely and propagandistically by Iranian officials, 
it arguably denotes a real conflict deeply rooted in 
Iran’s modern history.1 Soft war is the exercise of 
soft power by the United States on Iran such that it 
creates security challenges for the Islamic Republic 
and forces it to respond.2 The main challenge of soft 
1 For example, cyber-attacks are sometimes labeled as part of soft war. 
However, cyber-attacks constitute an exercise of coercive or hard 
power, whereas soft war, as normally used by Iranian conservatives, 
involves the exercise of what international relations scholar 
Joseph Nye calls “soft power.” Such distinctions are crucial for 
understanding the nature of soft war and will be explored in greater 
depth in part I. 
2 Although soft war can be analyzed in the context of the exercise of 
war is that large segments of the Iranian population 
are attracted to the United States, embracing key 
elements of its culture and political ideals, anathema 
for a regime founded on Islamic values and anti-
Americanism. As the gulf between the culture and 
political ideals of the Islamic Republic versus large 
segments of its population has widened, the regime’s 
power to influence Iranians has weakened and it 
has come under pressure to change its policies in a 
number of domains. Iran’s strategy to address this 
and other soft war challenges contains two main 
responses. The first is a hard response that seeks to 
control the conduits through which U.S. sources of 
soft power, culture, political ideals, and policies, 
enter Iran. These conduits include the Internet, 
satellite television,  and universities. The second is 
a soft response that attempts to create indigenous 
sources of soft power that are attractive to Iranians. 
In practice, thus far Iran’s strategy has placed greater 
emphasis on the hard response. Largely because the 
Iranian regime has failed to utilize the capacity of 
Iranian civil society to create attractive indigenous 
sources of soft power, the regime has been on the 
defensive in the soft war. 
Part I of this analysis gives a basic definition of 
soft war and lays out a theoretical framework for 
understanding it using international relations scholar 
Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power. Part II discusses 
the historical genealogy of soft war by tracing two 
distinct but interwoven threads: First, the rise of 
Islamic nativism in Iran, and second, the rise and fall 
of U.S. soft power in Iran from the mid-19th century 
to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Part III looks at 
the genesis of soft war under the Islamic Republic 
and how, while the terminology may be relatively 
new, the phenomenon it denotes is much older. Part 
IV analyzes Iran’s soft war strategy, comprising of a 
hard and soft response. The conclusion assesses to 
what extent this soft war strategy has been successful 
and examines the factors which may shift the balance 
in this conflict. 
soft power by any single Western state on Iran, the focus here is on 
the United States. This is because soft war in Iran today is typically 
invoked with reference to the United States. 
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I. THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK
Soft war as a conflict can be best understood using the 
idea of soft power coined by international relations 
scholar Joseph Nye, and is explained below using 
illustrations of the United States’ exercise of soft 
power on Iran.3 According to Nye, soft power is the 
“ability to get what you want through attraction rather 
than coercion or payments. When you can get others 
to want what you want, you do not have to spend 
as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your 
direction.”4 Here sticks and carrots refer to the well-
established idea of hard power, which grows out of a 
state’s economic and military strength. Soft power, in 
contrast, comes from “the attractiveness of a country’s 
culture, political ideals, and policies,” what Nye 
collectively calls a country’s “primary currencies,” 
or sources of soft power. Nye emphasizes that “It is 
not smart to discount soft power as just a question of 
image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity...
it is a form of power—a means of obtaining desired 
outcomes.” He cites the example of U.S.-Pakistan 
security cooperation, positing that although Pakistani 
General Pervez Musharraf (1943- ) found it in his 
interest to work with the United States in the War on 
Terror, the level of anti-Americanism in his country 
forced him to balance “concessions and retractions.” 
Nye concludes that if the United States exercised 
greater soft power on Pakistan, there would be more 
concessions.5
Culture is perhaps the preeminent example of a source 
of soft power. Nye remarks that “When a country’s 
culture includes universal values and its policies 
promote values and interests that others share, it 
3  The similarity between the terms “soft power” and “soft war” is 
likely not an accident. In fact, the concept of soft power may have 
been a template for formulating the idea of soft war. The Islamic 
Republic has a history of drawing on U.S. foreign policy and 
international relations concepts when formulating its own, often 
as a rejoinder. Thus, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” 
became Mohammad Khatami’s “dialogue of civilizations,” and 
George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” became the Islamic Republic’s 
“Axis of Resistance.” 
4  Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy.” Political 
Science Quarterly Summer 119.2 (2004): 256.
5  Ibid., 257.
increases the probability of obtaining its desired 
outcomes because of the relationships of attraction 
and duty that it creates.”6 The United States is the 
world’s pre-eminent exporter of culture—including 
film, music, publishing and fashion—consumed by 
billions of people around the globe. American culture 
does not convey a uniform message. There are, 
however, persistent themes that emerge over time, 
for example individualism, and when packaged in 
the right way these themes can speak to international 
audiences and create a sense of attraction and shared 
values and interests. Through American culture, 
an Iranian may come to feel attracted to and share 
certain values and interests with the United States and 
its citizens. When this happens, and pro-American 
Iranians have the power to bring about change, the 
United States can more easily achieve its foreign 
policy objectives in Iran. 
Political ideals are another major source of soft power 
and function in a similar way as culture. While the 
United States has no monopoly on the political ideals 
of self-determination, democracy or human rights, it 
is not for nothing that the United States was called 
the “leader of the free world” in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. Then and now, the United States 
is perceived by many as a defender of democracy 
and human rights around the world, although its 
credentials as an anti-colonial force have diminished 
significantly. Policies as a source of soft power are 
related to political ideals, but remain distinct. Nye 
points out that to the extent that U.S. policies are 
consistent with its political ideals, such as “democracy, 
human rights, and openness,” the United States will 
be better positioned to benefit from the trends of the 
“global information age” and expand its soft power: 
“Government policies at home and abroad are another 
potential source of soft power...Domestic or foreign 
policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, 
indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a 
6  Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics 
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 11.
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narrow approach to national interests can undermine 
soft power.”7 Thus, for instance, recent revelations 
regarding U.S. cyber-surveillance practices toward 
U.S. citizens make it more difficult for the United 
States to promote human rights abroad and convince 
foreign elites and audiences to abide by human rights 
standards. The same is true with regard to policies 
such as drone strikes on Yemen and Pakistan, which 
undercut the ideal the United States projects about 
being a responsible actor, versus a rogue state, in 
global affairs. 
Institutions are a source of soft power in a somewhat 
different way than those areas outlined above. For 
instance, international institutions can be a source of 
soft power through their agenda-setting prerogative. 
Using the example of international economic 
governance, Nye argues that international institutions 
working in this field “such as the International 
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade, tend to embody liberal, free-
market principles that coincide in large measure with 
American society and ideology.”8 When other states 
can be convinced to participate in these institutions, 
they adapt to American values and agendas, often 
reinforcing U.S. interests. 
         
Soft power, through attraction and agenda-setting, 
can legitimize a state’s power in the eyes of others 
and lower resistance to a state’s pursuit of its goals. 
If a state’s sources of soft power are attractive, others 
are more likely to accede to its wishes. Likewise if 
a state can use institutions to channel or constrain 
the behavior of others, it is less likely to resort to 
hard power, sparing it economic and military costs. 
With this said, the exercise of soft power is more 
complex than first meets the eye. The same sources 
of soft power that are attractive in one context can 
be unattractive in another: Culture that may generate 
attraction in Tel Aviv may have the opposite effect in 
Riyadh. Similarly, U.S. political ideals and policies 
that may have a receptive audience in Tokyo may be 
met with much greater skepticism in Beijing. Context 
matters greatly; in part III we will show that since 
7  Ibid., 14.
8  Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 168.
1989 a unique context has existed in Iran whereby 
U.S. sources of soft power have been able to attract 
key segments of the Iranian population.9
While states have been aware of the concept of soft 
power in some form or another throughout history, 
the information revolution has created powerful new 
conduits for projecting soft power. A state’s culture, 
political ideals and policies can reach a far wider 
audience on a much larger scale than ever before. Ever 
more powerful and low-cost hardware combined with 
increasingly better software means the exchange of 
information may continue expanding and becoming 
faster, meaning that states will likely have to pay 
more attention to soft power in the future.10
The story of the conflict the Islamic Republic calls 
soft war is in many ways the story of the exercise of 
U.S. soft power on Iran. Two of the main impulses 
underlying the foundation of the Islamic Republic 
in 1979 were the creation of an Islamic social 
and political order in Iran and anti-Americanism, 
impulses which continue to operate today through 
Khamenei and the conservative political current. 
U.S. soft power on Iran poses security challenges 
for the regime because, in the context of the ongoing 
U.S-Iran geopolitical rivalry, it undermines both the 
social and political order conservatives seek to create 
and their anti-Americanism by creating a relationship 
of attraction and shared values between the United 
States and Iranians and alienating the latter from the 
regime. The sense of threat felt by the conservatives 
from U.S. soft power, and the articulation of soft war 
as a conflict with the United States, is best illustrated 
by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei: 
Everyone today understands and knows that 
the confrontation between the Arrogance 
[United States] with the Islamic Republic is 
no longer like the confrontation of the first 
decade of the revolution. In that confrontation 
they exercised their power, and were defeated. 
That was a hard confrontation...However 
this is not the priority of the Arrogance for 
9  Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
10  Joseph S. Nye, “The Information Revolution and American Soft 
Power.” Asia-Pacific Review 9.1 (2002).
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confronting the Islamic regime. The priority 
today is what is called soft war; that is war 
using cultural tools, through infiltration [of 
our society], through lies, through spreading 
rumors. Through the advanced instruments 
that exist today, communication tools that 
did not exist 10, 15, and 30 years ago, have 
become widespread. Soft war means creating 
doubt in people’s hearts and minds.11 
As if to underscore the seriousness of soft war, 
Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri, deputy chief 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces 
General Staff, announced the creation of a “soft war 
headquarters” in late 2012 tasked with planning and 
executing Iran’s soft war strategy. Jazayeri explained 
soft war as follows: 
The enemy, by making attractive and presenting 
the Western lifestyle and upbringing, by its 
scientific and educational monopoly, and 
by spreading Western social behavior and 
the production of deviant values and beliefs, 
carries out its strategies in the soft war.12
In investigating conservatives’ ruminations on 
soft war, a relatively consistent picture of their 
fears emerges. U.S. exercise of soft power on 
Iran has attracted segments of Iranian society 
away from the regime and toward the United 
States. Especially since 1989, the allegiance of 
many Iranians to the regime has weakened and 
Iranians have become more receptive to U.S. 
culture, political ideals and policies. This increases 
pressure for policy changes anathema to Iranian 
conservatives, including social and political reforms 
and reconciliation with the United States. Having 
defined soft war by grounding it in the IR concept 
of soft power, we will now try to more concretely 
understand it through its historical genealogy. 
11  “Bayanat Dar Jam-e Kasiri Az Basijiyan Keshvar. (A speech to a 
large crow of the nation’s Basij)” The Center for Preserving and 
Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei. 25 
Nov. 2009. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
12  “Tashkil-e Gharargah-e Jang-e Narm dar Setad-e Koll-e Niruha-ye 
Mosallah. (The formation of a soft war headquarters in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran Armed Forces General Headquarters).” Fars News 
Agency. 01 Dec. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
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II. HISTORICAL 
GENEALOGY 
How did the soft war come about? This section traces 
the genealogy of soft war to two distinct but overlapping 
trends: first, the gradual development of anti-Western 
Islamic nativism in Iran from the 19th century onward 
as a result of the country’s historical encounter with the 
West culminating in the Islamic Revolution of 1979; 
and second, the rise, fall and rise again of American 
soft power in Iran over the same period. Specifically, 
the precipitous decline of U.S. soft power in Iran 
following the 1953 Anglo-America-backed coup 
d’etat significantly strengthened anti-Western Islamic 
nativists, who viewed Western influence on Iran as a 
malady they called “Westoxification,” enabling their 
triumph in the revolution. In its first bloody decade 
of revolution and war the Islamic Republic, a strong 
anti-Western Islamic nativist streak ingrained in its 
DNA, attempted (with moderate success) to eliminate 
Western influence through policies such as the “Cultural 
Revolution.” However, the traumatic experience of 
Iranian society with the Islamic Republic from 1979 to 
1989, the coming of age of a new generation of Iranians 
during the post-Iran-Iraq War era, and American 
resurgence in the post-Cold War era all converged 
to increase U.S. soft power in Iran after 1989. For a 
regime in part premised on anti-Americanism, the 
increase of its rival’s soft power undermines the 
Islamic Republic’s hold over Iranian society, thereby 
creating security challenges. The decision of the 
Islamic Republic, dominated by Khamenei and the 
conservatives, to address these challenges through a 
hard and soft response has led to a conflict labeled by 
the regime and here as soft war. 
Historical origins of anti-
Westernism in Iran:  
1813-1953
The history of Iran’s encounter with modernity and 
the West often starts with the series of wars between 
Qajar Iran and Tsarist Russia, which culminated in the 
loss of significant Iranian domains in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, enshrined in the treaties of Gulistan 
(1813) and Turkmenchay (1828).13 These traumatic 
events signaled a process of long-term internal decline 
and imperial encroachment for Iran lasting more than 
a century. While imperial encroachment began with 
the loss of territory to Tsarist Russia, it culminated 
in a much more intimate and invasive penetration of 
the Qajar state at the political and economic levels. 
Qajar shahs, feeble and beholden to Great Britain, 
Tsarist Russia and a host of other European powers, 
virtually surrendered much of the state to these powers 
and their agents in Iran. The most reviled examples 
of this include the Tobacco Concession of 1890 and 
the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919.14 These treaties, 
concessions and conventions not only weakened the 
writ of the Qajar regime, but also inflamed domestic 
public opinion by undermining the interests and values 
of various social, political and economic forces. 
One of the earliest proto-anti-Western movements 
was the Tobacco Revolt (1891), a nationwide boycott 
of tobacco triggered by the Tobacco Concession, 
which had given a British merchant control over the 
tobacco industry inside Iran, thereby disenfranchising 
Iranian farmers and merchants.15 A religious edict 
by a respected religious figure, Grand Ayatollah 
Mirza Mohammed Hassan Husseini Shirazi (1814-
1896), became a rallying point for opposition to the 
concession and led to its repeal. Episodes such as this 
demonstrated the hostility to Western imperial policies 
in Iran and foreshadowed the potential of Shi’a Islam 
for political mobilization. 
During this encounter with the West, the importation 
of Western political ideals also engendered resistance 
from certain forces, particularly from the Constitutional 
13  Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet 
Union, to 1921.” The Cambridge History of Iran. Ed. Avery Peter, 
Gavin R. Hambly, and C. P. Melville. Vol. 7. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 1991): 314-49.
14 Homa Katouzian, “The Campaign for the 1919 Agreement.” State and 
Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the 
Pahlavis. (London: I. B. Tauris: New York, 2000): 88-120.
15  Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest 
of 1891-1892. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
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Revolution onward. For example, the anti-constitutional 
forces, whose leading personages included such 
reviled figures as Mohammad Ali Shah (1872-1925) 
and Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri (1843-1909), opposed the 
creation of a Western-style constitution and parliament 
in Iran. In fact, the Shi’a clergy were one of the main 
bulwarks against modernization and Westernization as 
they believed these trends undermined the very basis 
of traditional power structures such as the Qajar court, 
landed nobility and the clergy itself.16 This history 
of Iran’s encounter with the West and imperialism in 
many ways set the stage for the rise of anti-Western 
Islamic nativism after the Anglo-American-backed 
coup d’état in 1953. 
A brief history of U.S. soft 
power in Iran: 1853-1953 
Understanding the history of United States-Iran 
relations is crucial to comprehending the emergence of 
soft war today. Despite the strong influence of U.S. soft 
power in Iran in the first century of relations between 
the two states, the 1953 coup d’état and the subsequent 
policies of the United States and the Pahlavi regime in 
Iran in the following quarter century created a profound 
break in this soft power and laid the groundwork for 
soft war. We begin our analysis in the mid-19th century 
to better understand the full historical context of the 
emergence of soft war. 
 
U.S.-Iran relations began a century before 1953 with 
the revered modernizing Iranian prime minister Mirza 
Taghi Khan Farahani (1807-1852), better known as 
Amir Kabir, who came into office in 1848. As outlined 
above, Qajar Iran found itself crushed between the 
imperial forces of Great Britain and Tsarist Russia. In 
the years between the Treaty of Gulistan and the 1953 
coup, the Qajar and Pahlavi regimes found themselves 
constantly looking for a third force that could balance 
out Britain and Russia. Amir Kabir sought out the 
United States for precisely these ends. The United 
States’ political ideals and policies—that is its anti-
16  This is not to say that all of the Shi’a clergy fell into this category. In 
fact, segments of the clergy were one of the main driving forces behind 
the Constitutional Revolution.
colonialism as a nation that had thrown off the shackles 
of British control, combined with the fact that it did 
not have interests in Iran—made it an attractive force 
to counterbalance the imperial powers. In this sense, 
Amir Kabir can be called the original architect of U.S.-
Iran relations. In October 1853 he helped conclude the 
Treaty of Friendship and Navigation between the two 
countries, shortly before he was killed and his foreign 
policy program of closer ties with the United States 
buried alongside him. 
The death of Amir Kabir, however, did not end attempts 
at engaging the United States. In the 1880s, Naser al-
Din Shah (1831-1896) revisited the establishment of 
better ties with the United States. Under President 
Chester A. Arthur (1829-1889), the United States 
established high-level diplomatic ties with Iran, 
sending Ambassador S.G.W. Benjamin (1837-1914) 
in 1883 to Tehran as chargé d’affaires to create what 
would eventually become a permanent mission.17 In 
1886, Iran sent Haj Hossein Gholi Khan Motamed al-
Vezareh (1849-1937) as minister plenipotentiary and 
envoy extraordinary to Washington.18 He was soon 
given the sobriquet “Haji Washington” for being the 
first high-level Iranian representative in Washington, 
D.C. Haji Washington wrote glowingly in his reports 
back to Tehran about American culture, political ideals 
and policies. He saw the United States as the nation 
of the future, a model Iran should endeavor toward, 
and a potential ally who could alleviate Iran’s strategic 
dilemmas. 
Despite the establishment of governmental ties during 
the 19th century, Iranians’ day-to-day experience with 
America was mostly through missionaries, scholars 
and other private citizens. One of the most prominent 
centers of secondary education in Iran today, Alborz 
High School, was founded by American Presbyterian 
missionary James Bassett (1834-1906).19 A young 
Princeton-educated Presbyterian missionary, Howard 
17  Badi Badiozamani, Iran and America: Rekindling a Love Lost. (New 
York: East-West Understanding, 2005): 5-7. 
18  Ibid., 8.
19  Thomas M. Ricks, “Alborz College of Tehran, Dr. Samuel Martin 
Jordan and the American Faculty: Twentieth-Century Presbyterian 
Mission Education and Modernism in Iran (Persia).” Iranian Studies 
44.5 (2011): 627-46.
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Baskerville (1885-1909), became a martyr of the 
Constitutional Revolution after he transformed his 
class of students at the American Memorial High 
School in Tabriz into a pro-constitutional column and 
led them into battle.20
Americans in government capacities also played 
significant positive roles in Iran’s national progress 
through institution-building. After the Constitutional 
Revolution, Jewish-American financial expert 
William Morgan Shuster (1877-1960) was 
appointed by the young Iranian parliament at the 
recommendation of U.S. President Howard William 
Taft in 1911 to put Iran’s disastrous financial affairs in 
order.21 The diligent work of Shuster to promote tax 
collection and administrative efficiency endangered 
the interests of the British and Russians, who profited 
greatly from the disorder and corruption in Iran. As 
a result the Russian government gave an ultimatum 
to parliament to remove Shuster, and its military 
forces bombarded parliament to force Shuster out 
in December 1911.22 The departure of Shuster led 
to public demonstrations. Renowned composer and 
poet Aref Ghazvini (1882-1934), considered the 
father of Iranian protest music, even wrote a poem-
song defending Shuster as a savior of the nation and 
lambasting domestic corruption of politicians and the 
intervention of foreign powers:
Woe upon the house whose guest departs it 
Lay down your life and do not let the guest 
leave
If Shuster leaves Iran, Iran will be thrown to 
the wind 
Oh youth do not let Iran be rent asunder
You [Shuster] are life to the dead body, you are 
the life of a world, you are royal treasure, You 
are eternal life, God willing you will remain, 
God willing you will remain...23
20 James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-
Iranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988): 16.
21  U.S. State Department adviser Arthur Chester Millspaugh (1883–
1955) played a similar role to Shuster during the Pahlavi regime. 
See: Arthur Chester Millspaugh, Americans in Persia. (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1946).
22 W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia. (New York: The 
Century Co., 1912).
23  Homa Katouzian, “Poetry of the Constitutional Revolution.” Homa 
It was, not surprisingly, what many consider the first 
clashes of the Cold War that drew the United States 
into Iran at a strategic level. In 1946, the Soviet 
Union, which had occupied northern Iran between 
1941 and 1945 as part of the Allied struggle against 
Nazi Germany, reneged on its promise to withdraw 
from Iran and helped create two client states in Iran’s 
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan regions.24 It was decisive 
American pressure under President Harry S. Truman 
(1884-1972) that forced the Soviets to withdraw in 
May 1946. These episodes before 1953 placed the 
United States in a very positive light in Iran. As the 
examples above demonstrate, the first century of 
U.S.-Iran relations was strongly positive and a period 
during which U.S. primary currencies were very 
attractive in Iran. With the dawn of the Cold War, 
however, a century of goodwill would be rapidly 
undone. 
operation Ajax and the rise 
of anti-Americanism: 1953-
1979
The tumultuous events of 1953 and the quarter 
century that followed would see the collision of 
more than a century of good U.S.-Iran relations 
with a strong anti-Western current in Iran’s polity, 
leading to the birth of a potent anti-Americanism 
that laid the foundations of soft war. The events of 
Operation Ajax, the August 1953 coup d’état that 
overthrew the democratically elected Iranian Prime 
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and suppressed 
the oil nationalization movement, have been well 
documented and will not be elaborated upon here.25 
Suffice it to say that the United States, with the 
provocation of Great Britain, played a major role in 
the overthrow of Mossadegh and the establishment 
of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi as an absolute 
monarch. There are several ironies in the central 
role the United States played in the coup. First, for 
Katouzian. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
24  Fernande Raine, “Stalin and the Creation of the Azerbaijan 
Democratic Party in Iran, 1945.” Cold War History 2.1 (2001); 
Archie Roosevelt, Jr. “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.” Middle 
East Journal 1.3 (1947).
25  Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the 
Roots of Middle East Terror. (Hoboken: J. Wiley & Sons, 2003).
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much of the pre-Cold War era the United States had 
had an anti-colonial streak, in part because of its 
history as a British colony. During Mossadegh’s oil 
nationalization campaign President Harry Truman 
did not take kindly to British machinations in Iran 
and was not enthusiastic about Britain’s efforts to 
foment a coup. Second, Mossadegh himself was at 
times considered an Americophile and looked to the 
United States, in much the same way Amir Kabir had, 
to balance out what he considered to be the nefarious 
influence of Great Britain and the Soviet Union. 
Despite this alignment of thinking and interests, 
however, the Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969) 
administration took steps to neutralize Mossadegh, 
in part because it viewed the oil nationalization issue 
through a Cold War lens. The fear was that Iran’s 
pro-Soviet communist party was waiting in the wings 
to seize power.26 
The 1953 coup resulted in a wave of political 
repression and the establishment of a government 
pliant to American and British interests on Cold War 
and oil issues. The coup left an indelible mark on 
20th century Iranian politics and played a key role in 
creating the extreme anti-Pahlavi and anti-American 
sentiments that led to the revolution in 1979. Given 
what we now know now about the illusory nature of 
the communist threat in Iran during this period, it 
appears that the United States obliterated soft power 
that it had built up over a century in order to secure 
British oil interests. Subsequent history makes it 
clear that this prize may well have not been worth 
the price. But the coup is only a part of the story of 
the rise of anti-Americanism in Iran in the quarter 
century between the fall of Mossadegh in 1953 and 
the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979. 
Several other aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward 
Iran created outrage in Iranian public opinion. 
The U.S.-Israeli contribution to the creation of the 
Pahlavi regime’s despised secret police, the National 
Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK)—
responsible for the arrest, torture, and execution 
26 Ervand Abrahamian, “The Tudeh Party.” Iran Between Two 
Revolutions. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982): 281-325.
of hundreds of Iranians—was perceived as a very 
real manifestation of U.S. oppression of the Iranian 
people. The Richard Nixon administration’s attempt 
to make Iran its regional policeman under the Guam 
Doctrine created a sense that Iran no longer had even 
the semblance of an independent foreign policy. The 
coup and the strong support provided by the United 
States to the Pahlavi regime also made many Iranians 
feel that the latter only existed at the whims of the 
former. In the long term, this meant that the worst 
of the Pahlavi regime’s excesses became associated 
with the United States.27 The hand of the United States 
was seen as being behind every negative occurrence: 
the Pahlavi regime’s troubling human rights record, 
its lopsided economic policies, and the capitulation 
of 1964 which exempted U.S. government personnel 
and their families from the Iranian justice system. 
From this perspective, which began to gain wide 
acceptance in the late 1960s, those who sought to 
strike down the Pahlavi regime believed they had to 
first strike at its puppeteer, the United States. As Nye 
warns can happen when political ideals and policies 
clash, this mismatch between U.S. political ideals 
such as human rights and democracy and its Cold 
War foreign policy seriously eroded the attractiveness 
of U.S. primary currencies in Iran and created an 
environment where anti-Americanism thrived. 
Anti-imperialism and 
Westoxification: 1953-1979
the tudeh & anti-imperialism
Anti-Americanism in Iran is often associated with 
the Khomeinists who seized the U.S. embassy in 
Tehran in 1979. Yet in adopting anti-imperialism 
and especially anti-Americanism as key elements in 
their ideological framework, the Khomeinists were 
not innovating but merely tapping into the zeitgeist 
and a pre-existing deep reservoir of negative feelings 
toward the United States in the Iranian polity. The 
intellectual machinery of anti-Americanism was in 
fact pioneered by the Iranian left and a group which 
27  Ervand Abrahamian,  “Iran in Revolution: The Opposition Forces.” 
MERIP 75/76. Mar. - Apr. (1979).
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political scientist Mehrzad Boroujerdi has called 
Iranian nativist intellectuals.28
Arguably, the foundations of the virulent anti-
Americanism of the 1979 revolution were laid by 
the Tudeh Party of Iran (Hezb-e Tudeh-e Iran), Iran’s 
pro-Soviet communist party. Despite facing a high 
level of repression throughout its life, the Tudeh 
during the 1940s and 1950s was able to build one 
of the most disciplined and effective mass political 
organizations in Iran’s modern history.29 Given the 
Soviet Union’s tremendous soft power at the time, 
the Tudeh became a magnet for intellectuals and 
left a strong imprint on the opposition politics of 
the period.30 It was one of the first political parties 
in Iran to articulate a coherent anti-Imperialist, and 
specifically anti-American, discourse. This was in 
line with the organization’s Cold War politics, which 
demanded unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Union 
and hostility to its enemies. As a CIA report from 
1949 stated: 
From 1946 on, the [Tudeh] party organs have 
parroted Soviet pronouncements about the U.S. 
… A party directive of October 1948 ordered 
that “the U.S. in general and U.S. policy in 
Iran, with emphasis on the arms credit program 
in particular, should be subject to severe press 
attacks”... [Tudeh] has flatly accused the U.S. 
of having an imperialistic policy “designed 
to enforce American political, economic, and 
military rule all over the world.”31
The Tudeh was almost unique in advocating a strong 
anti-Americanism during the oil nationalization 
campaign. While the Tudeh was heavily repressed 
after 1953 and would never quite regain its former 
strength, its anti-Americanism would live on and 
combine with a broader backlash against the United 
States after 1953. As outlined above, this backlash 
28  Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The 
Tormented Triumph of Nativism. (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 1996).
29  Abrahamian, “The Tudeh Party.”
30  L. P. Elwell-Sutton, “Political Parties in Iran 1941-1948.” Middle 
East Journal 3.1 (1949).
31  “The Tudeh Party: Vehicle of Communism in Iran” Rep. no. ORE 
23-49. (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1949): 7.
was aggravated by the policies of the Pahlavi regime, 
which were perceived as having America’s full 
backing. 
Iranian nativist intellectuals & 
Westoxification
The Anglo-American coup d’etat in 1953, U.S. 
foreign policy in the post-coup era, and many of the 
Pahlavi regime’s unpopular policies, which were 
attributed to the United States, led to a precipitous 
decline in U.S. soft power in Iran. In such a climate, 
the Tudeh’s anti-Americanism could thrive. The 
intellectual and organizational vacuum left by the 
effective repression of the Tudeh and National Front 
in the post-coup era meant that the mantle of anti-
Americanism was picked up by a younger generation 
who were radicalized by their experiences during 
this period. Diverse in origin, this generation was 
defined by a group which Boroujerdi has called 
Iranian nativist intellectuals. Boroujerdi defines 
“nativism” as “the doctrine that calls for the 
resurgence, reinstatement or continuance of native 
or indigenous cultural customs, beliefs and values. 
Nativism is grounded on such deeply held beliefs 
as resisting acculturation, privileging one’s own 
‘authentic’ identity, and longing for a return to “an 
unsullied indigenous cultural tradition.”32 Whereas 
the Tudeh’s communism and the National Front’s 
liberal nationalism had been Western in origin, 
Iranian nativists rejected all that was Western as an 
affliction and sought to rediscover Iran’s authentic 
identity. Put in Nye’s soft power framework, nativists 
rejected Western primary currencies for indigenous 
ones. In the post-1953 nativist turn these intellectuals 
did not emphasize Iran’s pre-Islamic “Aryan” 
identity, but an Islamic one. As Ali Shari’ati, one of 
Iran’s most prominent intellectuals and the leading 
political thinker of this period, pointed out: 
Islamic civilization has worked like scissors 
and has cut us off completely from our pre-
Islamic past...Our people do not find their roots 
in these civilizations. They are left unmoved by 
the heroes, geniuses, myths, and monuments of 
32   Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West, 14.
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these ancient empires. Our people remember 
nothing from this distant past and do not care 
to learn about the pre-Islamic civilizations...
Consequently, for us return to our roots means 
not a rediscovery of pre-Islamic Iran, but a 
return to our Islamic, especially Shi’i, roots.33
Many of the most prominent intellectual architects 
of this Islamic nativist project were lay secular and 
religious thinkers. Few others, with the possible 
exception of Shari’ati, exemplify the lay Islamic 
nativists better than Jalal Al-e Ahmad. Over the course 
of his career, Al-e Ahmad migrated from the secular 
left to Islamic nativism. His 1962 monograph, entitled 
Westoxification, was an intellectual bombshell that 
set the tone for Islamic nativism in Iran for decades 
to come, and is perhaps one of the most important 
intellectual sources of the soft war today. 
Al-e Ahmad popularized Westoxification to the 
extent that the concept became a staple of the 
Iranian opposition’s critique of the Pahlavi regime’s 
modernization program and continues to exist in the 
Islamic Republic’s political lexicon. Westoxification, 
according to Al-e Ahmad, was an affliction that 
alienated Iranians from their roots, perpetrated by 
the West through its penetration of Iran and through 
Westoxicated Iranians. Al-e Ahmad viewed the West, 
via its machinery and technology, as being corrosive 
to traditional Iranian society.34 As Boroujerdi points 
out, “Al-e Ahmad believed that this pandemic 
could result in the eradication of Iran’s cultural 
authenticity, political sovereignty, and economic 
well-being.”35 The “vaccine” posited by Al-e Ahmad 
to the disease of Westoxifcation was Shi’a Islam, 
which he maintained had attained a special place in 
the Iranian social psyche as an inseparable aspect of 
Iranian identity.36 
33  Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 470.
34  For example, see Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West, 70: 
“As the machine entrenches itself in the towns and villages, be it in 
the form of a mechanized mill or textile plant, it puts the worker in 
local craft industries out of work. It closes the village mill. It renders 
the spinning wheel useless. Production of pile carpets, flat carpets, 
felt carpets is at an end.”
35   Ibid., 68.
36   Ibid., 72.
This anti-Western Islamic nativism had a profound 
influence in shaping the post-1953 political opposition, 
and with the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 
moved from the intellectual margins to underpin the 
Islamic Republic’s ideological framework. 
the Islamic revolution 
and the height of anti-
Americanism: 1979-1989
While the Islamic Revolution of 1979 began as a 
pluralistic movement against the Pahlavi regime, it 
ended with the triumph of the Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini and his Islamist followers. At the center 
of the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic 
created by Khomeini was a political Islam deeply 
influenced by the post-1953 Islamic nativism. From 
the outset the new regime, which had authoritarian 
tendencies, was premised on asserting an authentic 
Islamic identity for Iran and anti-Westernism. The 
decline of U.S. soft power in Iran was thus accelerated 
by the Islamic Republic, which tapped into the genuine 
popular enthusiasm for the revolution to create its 
own sources of soft power and to attack conduits of 
U.S. soft power. Whether the culture of the Islamic 
hijab, which promoted modesty, or the political ideal 
of “Guardianship of the Jurist” (velayat-e faghih), 
which attempted to reconcile divinely sanctioned 
government with popular participation, the Islamic 
Republic was able to generate new sources of soft 
power with genuine popular support inside and 
outside the country. 
The new regime’s authoritarian tendency alongside 
its anti-Westernism worked together to restrict U.S. 
soft power and its conduits. Mass media, including 
television, radio, books, newspapers, magazines, 
films and music cassettes, were regulated to include 
content produced by the regime and exclude content 
deemed “un-Islamic.” Universities, important 
centers for the production of knowledge and elites, 
were also brought under attack. What came to be 
known as the Cultural Revolution is perhaps one of 
the clearest expressions of the political consequences 
of anti-Western Islamic nativism. In July 1980, 
Khomeini appointed seven trusted subordinates to 
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the Council of the Cultural Revolution (CCR), which 
was tasked with Islamizing the university space and 
curriculum and did so through two primary means.37 
First, a regime-backed student group, the Office for 
Consolidating Unity in Seminaries and Universities 
(OCU), enforced a strict Islamic code of behavior 
and dress, expelled “un-Islamic” students and faculty 
and quashed dissent. Second, the CCR attempted 
to Islamize university curricula, particularly in the 
social sciences and humanities. During the 1979-
1980 academic year, the regime closed universities 
to Islamize them, and an unprecedented purge 
commenced. When universities reopened in 1983, 
only 148,117 of 217,174 students were allowed to 
return. An unknown number were never allowed 
37  The members of the Council included Jalaledin Farsi, Shams Al-e 
Ahmad (brother of the famous Jalal Al-e Ahmad), Rabani Amlashi, 
Mohammad Javad Bahnoar, Hassan Habibi, Ali Shariatmadari and 
Abdul-Karim Soroush.
to enter university from high school. Purges also 
expelled numerous faculty members.38
Therefore, in the years immediately following the 
revolution the balance of soft power shifted in favor 
of the Islamic Republic. Yet by the end of the decade 
following 1979 the pendulum began swinging in the 
other direction. The reasons for this were manifold, 
but included the suffocating social atmosphere, 
the absence of political pluralism promised by 
the revolution, the bleak economic situation, the 
execution, torture and imprisonment of tens of 
thousands as part of the revolutionary terror, and 
hundreds of thousands of casualties in the Iran-Iraq 
War. The changing international situation after 1989 
decisively pushed the pendulum in favor of U.S. soft 
power. This is the milieu in which soft war emerged.
38  Mehrak Kamali, “Goftogu Ba Mohammad Maleki: Kasi Az Ma 
Nazar Nakhaast (Interview with Mohammad Maleki: No One Asked 
for Our Opinion).” M.ghaed. Dec. 1999. Online. Accessed 03 July 
2013.
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III. SOFT WAR IN THE 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
OF IRAN
While the term soft war itself has only existed 
since the late 2000s,39 it captures a conflict that 
the regime has faced since its inception. Given the 
Islamic Republic’s authoritarian tendencies, its 
Islamic and anti-American foundations, and its 30-
year long conflict with the United States, it is not 
difficult to see why the ability of U.S. soft power to 
influence a large segment of Iran’s population poses 
security challenges for the governing authorities. 
For instance, in the realm of political ideals the 
desire of many Iranians for democracy and human 
rights in the Western sense can run counter to the 
Islamic Republic’s political ideal of “Guardianship 
of the Jurist.” When those segments of the Iranian 
population who share American political ideals 
actively struggle for them, as some believe happened 
in the Green Movement demonstrations, they 
can threaten the ideological edifice of the Islamic 
Republic and the power of Iranian conservatives. 
Of course, we must be careful not to essentialize the 
Islamic Republic in the discussion of soft war. Not all 
political currents in the Islamic Republic have been 
fully committed to anti-Western Islamic nativism—
especially since 1989. It is the conservatives, 
who tend to be more politically authoritarian and 
socially conservative than their rivals and dominate 
the majority of the regime’s elected and unelected 
centers of power, who have been most committed to 
nativism and felt most threatened by U.S. soft power. 
What follows traces how the United States once 
again came to exercise soft power on Iran after 1989. 
Shift in the balance of soft 
power: 1989-present
The swinging of the pendulum back toward U.S. 
soft power in Iran dates to the late 1980s/early 
1990s. Domestically, the death of Khomeini, the 
39  The earliest example found by the authors was in 2007.
need for reconstruction in the bloody aftermath of 
the revolution and war, and dissatisfaction with the 
regime among Iranians at large created the impetus 
for wide-scale change within Iran. Internationally, 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning 
of the American unipolar moment vastly expanded 
U.S. soft power and made it more difficult for Iran 
to ignore this power. From this point forward, three 
mutually reinforcing processes would make Iran 
fertile soil for U.S. sources of soft power.  
First, a new and younger generation of Iranians, a 
product of the post-revolution baby boom, who had 
not experienced the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic 
Revolution or the Iran-Iraq War as adults, began to 
mature. They entered society via universities, the 
workplace and polling booths, and took their place 
as citizens. The old slogans of the revolution did 
not represent many of their needs or desires. Having 
grown up in the socially suffocating, economically 
bleak and politically repressive revolutionary 
and war eras, these young citizens sought greater 
social freedom, economic opportunity and political 
representation.40 Second, this new generation 
drove and in turn was driven by developments on 
the political front. The presidency of Ali-Akbar 
Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989-1997) kicked off Iran’s 
re-opening to the world via limited economic 
liberalization and diplomatic gestures. Then in 1997 
Mohammad Khatami was elected president (1997-
2005). The Reformists, led by Khatami, riding on the 
needs and desires of the younger generation and their 
disaffected parents, broke onto the political stage 
and won successive electoral victories in presidential 
and parliamentary elections. The Reformists’ 
advocacy for “civil society,” entailing greater social, 
political and cultural pluralism, and “dialogue of 
40  Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Post Revolutionary Iran and the New 
Social Movements.” Twenty Years of Islamic Revolution: Political 
and Social Transition in Iran since 1979. Ed. Eric J. Hooglund. 
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002): 3-18.
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civilizations,” which involved the re-establishment 
of friendly ties with the West, somewhat expanded 
the social and political space in which the new 
generation could make their demands. Finally, the 
relatively more open atmosphere in universities 
beginning in 1989 and gradually improving until 
2005 created a unique space for Iranian academics 
and students, particularly in the social sciences and 
humanities, to explore a broader range of ideas. 
Universities once again became vibrant forums for a 
wide range of social, political, economic and cultural 
debates where Western ideas were able to exert an 
increasingly powerful influence. The movement to 
translate Western works into Farsi familiarized Iran’s 
best and brightest at elite universities with the West’s 
intellectual legacies. 
These three mutually reinforcing processes created 
a small opening through which U.S. sources 
of soft power could trickle in, and advances in 
communications technology that took hold in Iran 
in the mid-1990s turned this trickle into a flood. 
Satellite television and the Internet became powerful 
new conduits for the U.S. primary currencies. 
Before the mid-1990s Iranians’ access to alternative 
communication media not approved by the regime 
was limited to Western radio broadcasts and 
bootlegged audio and video cassettes which were 
carefully circulated between friends and family. 
With the entry of illegal satellite dishes Iranians 
now had access to a wider selection of content, from 
television series that promoted alternative lifestyles 
to news programs that presented narratives starkly 
different from those of the regime. The global 
Internet, introduced around the same period, had 
a similar effect but on a larger scale because of 
its accessibility through universities, cafes and 
eventually homes. Popular demand, the Khatami 
administration’s investment in telecommunication 
infrastructure, and weak regulation of the Internet 
early on made it an especially potent conduit for 
U.S. sources of soft power. 
These processes in the post-1989 context transformed 
Iran’s youth in the cultural, social and political 
spheres into a group that the regime had increasing 
difficulty controlling, particularly in urban areas 
where most Iranians reside. Western culture, despite 
being officially banned, was gradually seeping into 
the bones of Iranian society. Regime-enforced social 
norms began to change as well, with many youth 
rejecting traditional Islamic values for Western ones. 
The crème of Iran’s youth, those who performed well 
in the grueling national university entrance exams 
and won international science olympiads, opted to 
pursue careers in the West because of the lack of 
opportunities in Iran and the attractiveness of cutting-
edge Western universities. This started the first major 
wave of brain drain since the revolution and war. On 
the political front, the political ideal of Guardianship 
of the Jurist came under critique in public spaces and 
regime policies were scrutinized as never before. 
When taken together, this meant that there was an 
increasingly large gap between the culture, political 
ideals, and policy preferences of large segments of 
society on one hand and the regime on the other. 
The concepts of “cultural assault,” “cultural night-
raid” and “cultural NATO,” predecessors of the 
concept of soft war in the regime’s lexicon, emerged 
in this context. What elevated the exercise of U.S. soft 
power on Iran to a “war” for Iranian conservatives 
during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 
(2005-2013) were geo-political tensions with the 
United States and the fear of regime change. The 
color revolutions of the former Soviet bloc in the 
2000s, which had varying degrees of U.S. support, 
convinced the Islamic Republic that its own people 
could be co-opted by the United States as Trojan 
horses to overthrow the regime. Indeed, this fear 
seemingly became a reality during the June 2009 to 
February 2011 Green Movement demonstrations. To 
Iranian conservatives, the demonstrators of the Green 
Movement represented culture, political ideals, and 
policy preferences anathema to their own. In the 
aftermath of the repression of the Green Movement, 
the regime decided that an improved strategy for 
the soft war was needed. The next section covers 
the Islamic Republic’s strategy in the soft war. The 
regime is still grappling with how to deal with U.S. 
soft power and has only been partially successful in 
responding to it. 
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IV. HARD & SOFT 
RESPONSES 
What has the Islamic Republic’s strategy been for 
fighting the soft war? It has not formally articulated 
a coherent strategy, but from a observation of its 
actions the image of a de facto strategy emerges. 
This strategy has rested on two pillars: a hard and 
soft response. As we will show, while the Islamic 
Republic has been relatively successful in using 
coercive means to limit U.S primary currencies 
(hard response), it has been much less successful 
in creating attractive indigenous primary currencies 
(soft response). This is because primary currencies, 
or sources of soft power, are not monopolized by the 
state but are mainly produced by civil society. The 
repression of civil society by the Iranian state has 
crippled its ability to generate attractive sources of 
soft power. Given the Islamic Republic’s emphasis 
on controlling conduits of U.S. sources of soft power 
through a hard response, we begin by investigating 
three examples of these conduits before turning to 
the regime’s strategy in earnest.  
the conduits of U.S. soft 
power 
The Islamic Republic’s leadership considers the 
Internet as one of the biggest purveyors of U.S. 
primary currencies. Not only can the Internet 
be used to consume a wide range of content in 
multiple formats, it also serves as an optimal tool 
for communication and social networking. Gmail, 
Facebook and Twitter are all perceived as conduits 
for seditious individuals to communicate and create 
social networks that undermine Iranian society’s 
Islamic socio-cultural values and the regime’s 
political ideals and policies.41 
Another challenge has been the creation of an 
alternative Farsi media targeted at Iranians by 
Western governments and Iranians in the diaspora, 
mainly via satellite television. The Voice of America 
41  “Momen-Nasab: Beware the Evils of Google!” IranPolitik. 23 Aug. 
2011. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
(VOA) Persian News Network (PNN) and British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Persian service 
have now become major sources of Farsi content, 
especially news. VOA’s former show Parazit, a 
weekly political satire program, gave a satiric look 
at the regime’s leadership not provided by traditional 
media within Iran, to popular acclaim among young 
Iranians.42 Manoto TV, a private satellite network 
with a greater focus on entertainment, showcases a 
new generation of Iranian actors, broadcasters and 
musicians as well as decidedly Western-leaning 
socio-cultural values. The network has found success 
by its ability to attract talent and showcase work 
that falls outside of the regime’s boundaries. As this 
alternative media grows, it makes U.S. sources of 
soft power easier for Iranian audiences to absorb and 
threatens to divert them from regime programming. 
A third key conduit of soft power are universities, and 
in particular social sciences and the humanities. As 
outlined in Part III, despite the Cultural Revolution, 
Western social sciences and the humanities began 
re-entering Iranian universities in a major way 
in the 1990s and 2000s. Although the regime has 
not always strictly problematized the diffusion of 
Western social sciences and the humanities through 
Iranian universities as soft war, statements by senior 
Iranian leaders make clear that it is viewed within the 
same framework. Iran’s supreme leader has stated 
quite succinctly why the threat of the diffusion of 
Western “human sciences,” the term used in Iran for 
the social sciences and humanities, through Iranian 
universities can be seen as part of soft war. Speaking 
to a gathering of seminary students, Khamenei 
warned of the dangers and alien nature of Western 
human sciences to Islamic Iran and underlined why 
it is important for the country to produce its own 
indigenous human science:
42  “Iran’s ‘Daily Show.’” CNN. 13 Jan. 2011. Online. Accessed 03 July 
2013.
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This human science which is current today has 
content which is essentially in opposition to the 
Islamic movement and Islamic regime; it relies 
on another ideology, it has another argument, 
and has a different goal. When these [human 
sciences] become current, officials become 
trained according to them; the very same 
officials come to lead universities, the national 
economy, and domestic, foreign, and security 
policies, etc.43
Hard responses
The core of the Islamic Republic’s strategy for dealing 
with U.S. soft power has been overwhelmingly 
characterized by the use of hard responses—the use 
of coercive measures—to disrupt the conduits of U.S. 
primary currencies. In September 2012, the Islamic 
Republic announced implementation of phase one 
of the National Information Network (NIN) project. 
According to the regime, this initiative seeks to 
severely limit Iranians’ access to the global Internet 
by creating a national intranet. Phase one took 
42,000 sensitive government computers offline and 
onto the NIN, and later phases would do the same 
for most other computers in the country.44 By forcing 
most inside Iran onto the NIN, the regime could not 
only more effectively limit the content individuals 
consume, but would also be able to better monitor 
them and feed them with state-produced content. As 
of the time of writing, however, it remains unclear 
what the NIN will look like in its final form and how 
isolated Iranians will be from the Internet. 
Even without the NIN, however, the regime still 
has a fairly powerful Internet filtering regime in 
place. With the assistance of Chinese, Russian 
and European telecommunications software and 
hardware makers,45 the Islamic Republic has been 
43  “Bayanat dar Didar-e Tolab, Fozala va Asatid Hawzeh-ye Elmieh 
Qom (Speech in a meeting with the students and scholars of the 
hawzeh of Qom).” The Center for Preserving and Publishing the 
Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei. 21 Oct. 2010. 
Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
44  “Iranian Information Minister: National Internet to Cut off All 
Government Computers from the World Wide Web.” IranPolitik. 19 
Sept. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
45  Eli Lake, “Fed Contractor, Cell Phone Maker Sold Spy System to 
Iran.” The Washington Times. 13 Apr. 2009. Online. Accessed 03 
July 2013.
able to create mechanisms to block ordinary Iranians 
from seeing content it deems undesirable, monitor 
their activities and slow the Internet down to a trickle 
during sensitive periods when e-mail and online 
social networks could help mobilize large numbers of 
people. This process was intensified by the creation 
of the cyber police in February 2011, which enabled 
the regime to bring its persecution of online activists 
within a legal framework and apply prison sentences 
and physical intimidation as means to control their 
activities.46 The arrest of blogger Sattar Beheshiti, 
who later died in police custody, is just one example 
of this.47 The process of greater state control over the 
Internet has also been extended more informally, for 
instance by an IRGC affiliate’s acquisition of Iran’s 
main Internet provider and largest telecom firm, the 
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI).48 
Like much of the Islamic Republic’s policymaking, 
however, the use of hard responses to limit the 
penetration of U.S. sources soft power through the 
Internet has been done in an ad hoc and diffuse 
manner. With the creation of the Supreme Council of 
Cyberspace (SCC), formed under the direct orders of 
Khamenei to institute a comprehensive policy plan 
for cyberspace, this may now be changing.49 The SCC 
brings together a wide range of key power-brokers 
in the regime, including the president, speaker of 
parliament, chief justice, commander of the IRGC 
and minister of intelligence, among others.
To confront the beaming of foreign satellite 
television programs into Iran, the regime has used 
similarly hard responses. The sale and possession 
of unlicensed satellite dishes and receivers in Iran 
is punishable under the law by fines and prison 
46  “Fata, Vahed-e Jadide Polic-e Iran Bara-ye Control-e Faza-ye 
Internet. (Fata, a new Iranian police unit for controlling the Internet).” 
BBC - Persian. 23 Jan. 2011. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
47  Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iranian Facebook Activist Sattar Beheshti 
Feared Dead in Custody.” The Guardian. 07 Nov. 2012. Online. 
Accessed 03 July 2013.
48  Saeed Kamali Dehghan, “Iran Tightens Online Censorship to 
Counter US ‘shadow Internet.’” The Guardian. 13 July 2011. Online. 
Accessed 03 July 2013.
49 “The Islamic Republic Takes Another Decisive Step Towards 
Controlling Cyberspace in Iran.” IranPolitik. 28 Mar. 2012. Online. 
Accessed 03 July 2013.
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sentences.50 Outside these legal deterrents, the 
regime regularly raids homes in order to collect or 
destroy satellite dishes on people’s rooftops. Finally, 
the regime uses satellite jamming to block much of 
the undesired satellite transmissions from beaming 
into Iranian homes. These latter two policies have 
even generated varying degrees of criticism from 
within the regime.51
The Islamic Republic’s policies for fighting the 
soft war in universities have been similar to those 
used during the Cultural Revolution of the 1980s, 
albeit less extreme. Since 2005 many professors 
have been forcibly retired or purged,52 and this 
process was accelerated after the Green Movement 
demonstrations.53 Since 2006 the regime has created 
a “star” system to identify troublesome students 
and exclude them from higher education.54 In 
Iran’s hyper-competitive education system, where 
admission to elite universities can be the difference 
between success and failure in life, the star system 
has had a chilling effect on campus social and 
political activism as well as students’ desire to pursue 
social science and humanities degrees. The regime 
has also historically had a system of quotas that 
ensures that there is a higher proportion of university 
students from its core constituencies, including the 
Mobilization Resistance Force (better known as the 
“Basij”). Next, the regime has once again started 
imposing the Islamic moral code in universities, 
50  Golnaz Esfandiari, “Nothing Comes Between Iranians And Their 
Satellite Dishes -- Not Even The Police.” Radio Free Europe / Radio 
Liberty. 13 Mar. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
51  “When It Comes to Fighting the ‘Soft War,’ Iran Only Has Hard 
Tools.” IranPolitik. 25 Apr. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
52  Nazila Fathi, “Iranian Leader Wants Purge of Liberals From 
Universities.” The New York Times, 06 Sept. 2006. Online. Accessed 
03 July 2013.
53  “Purge of Independent-Minded Professors Underway.” International 
Campaign for Human Rights in Iran. 19 Apr. 2010. Online. Accessed 
03 July 2013.
54  The star system, under the auspices of the Ministry of Science, 
Research, and Technology, assigns a star to a student’s record for a 
first offence, which can range widely from ‘moral’ (i.e. not adhering 
to the Islamic dress code) to ‘political’ (i.e. distributing leaflets), 
resulting in a warning. A second star is assigned to a student’s record 
after their second offence, meaning that students are only allowed to 
re-enter university by accepting certain terms and conditions. Finally, 
a third star for a third offence means that a student is excluded 
from higher education in Iran. For more on the purges, see Frances 
Harrison, “’Mass Purges’ at Iran Universities.” BBC. 20 Dec. 2006. 
Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
limiting male-female interaction and implementing a 
dress code. Finally, sensing a threat from the high 
proportion of females in universities and decreasing 
marriage and birth rates, the regime created quotas in 
2012 to limit women in universities.55
The regime has supplemented the hard response in its 
strategy by building better conduits of the sources of 
soft power. Domestically, this has been characterized 
by an increasing presence online, such as the creation 
of a Facebook account by Khamenei,56 and greater 
professionalism in existing media outlets. Abroad, 
this has entailed the creation of new conduits. The 
prime example of this has been Press TV, the Islamic 
Republic’s 24-hour English-language international 
news channel. Press TV plays to foreign audiences 
by emphasizing Islamic, anti-Imperialist and anti-
American themes. It is questionable, however, how 
successful these efforts have been. At best, they 
appear to be half measures that repackage Iran’s 
waning primary currencies at home and abroad. The 
Islamic Republic’s real shortcoming, however, has 
been in generating new attractive indigenous sources 
of soft power. 
building the sources of soft 
power
While in the first decade after the Islamic Revolution 
of 1979 the Islamic Republic was able to build 
attractive indigenous sources of soft power and 
even project soft power abroad, since 1989 its 
soft power has declined. At least two causes have 
been at the center of this decline. First, the Islamic 
Republic lacks the economic dynamism that is often 
a prerequisite for producing the financial and social 
capital that underlies attractive sources of soft power. 
Second, there has been no systematic government 
policy for allocating adequate funding and providing 
the right legal and regulatory framework to facilitate 
the production of attractive sources of soft power. 
Iranian conservatives, who have dominated the 
regime in the post-1989 period, have blocked elite- 
55  Zakiyyah Wahab,”Universities in Iran Put Limits on Women’s 
Options.” The New York Times. 20 Aug. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 
July 2013.
56  “Iran Cyber Front: Khamenei Likes Facebook.” IranPolitik. 28 Dec. 
2012. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
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and grassroots-level initiatives for creating attractive 
sources of soft power. 
The lack of a vibrant economy places significant 
restraints on the creation of attractive primary 
currencies for generating soft power. The United 
States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and, 
increasingly, emerging economies such as China and 
India, to list just a few, have all been able to develop 
attractive sources of soft power in part because of 
powerful economies. For example, the United States’ 
economic vitality has allowed it to create well-funded 
and advanced film, music and fashion industries 
that are able to market their best cultural products 
globally. Likewise, the powerful U.S. economy has 
enabled the creation of well-endowed universities 
that conduct cutting-edge research and attract some 
of the world’s top minds, consequently setting much 
of the international research and teaching agenda. 
Although Iran has enormous economic potential, 
its economy has faced chronic problems and been 
unable to produce long-term growth.
Next, the Islamic Republic’s restrictions on both 
elite and grass-roots social, political and cultural 
freedoms, as well as poor state-civil society relations, 
undermine Iran’s ability to create attractive sources 
of soft power. Nye points out that the sources of soft 
power are not monopolized by states to the same 
extent that hard power is, but are largely produced 
by civil society.57 Iran has ample material to create 
sources of soft power that are attractive within Iran 
and internationally, yet the regime’s limitations 
on freedoms inside Iran as well as its recycling of 
primary currencies from the first decade of revolution 
and war prevent innovation in this area. The Islamic 
Republic’s sources of soft power have not been 
renovated to adequately synchronize with the 
everyday experience and tastes of ordinary Iranians 
today, particularly youth.
In the area of culture, there is a treasure trove of 
artifacts from Shi’a culture, non-Islamic Iranian 
culture, and the Islamic Republic’s culture which, 
if adapted to contemporary circumstances, could 
57  Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
prove very attractive. Yet, for instance, despite the 
capacity of Shi’a culture to capture a new generation 
through novel forms and presentations, the regime 
has insisted on an orthodox interpretation of this faith 
and restrained lay and clerical religious intellectual 
and artistic innovators, limiting its appeal. Non-
religious artists who have nonetheless shown interest 
and competence in dealing with Shi’a themes 
have found themselves impeded. Take the Islamic 
Republic’s treatment of Bahram Bayzai, a pillar of 
Iranian cinema who wrote the screenplay for The 
Day of the Event, the popular film which masterfully 
retells the story of Ashura, the Shi’a holy day that 
commemorates the martyrdom of Imam Hossein.58 
Not only has the Islamic Republic not been able 
to create a film industry capable of absorbing and 
facilitating the work of such a talent, but it has actually 
impeded his career. We can also point to composer 
Hossein Alizadeh’s acclaimed symphony Ney-Nava, 
which has been interpreted as representing Imam 
Hossein’s martyrdom on Ashura. Such works show 
the potential of various musical forms to popularize 
Shi’a culture.59 But rather than supporting innovative 
indigenous music, no less than Khamenei himself has 
spoken out against listening to and making music. 
Fashion is another case in point. The regime has 
fought against Western fashion since the revolution 
and continually frets about the “immodest” fashion of 
youth today. But it has it failed to formulate attractive 
alternatives that most young Iranians today would 
readily embrace; in many quarters the Islamic hijab 
promoted by the regime is seen as a symbol of its 
backwardness and oppression of women. This need 
not be the case. Muslim women around the world, 
especially in places like Turkey but also in Iran itself, 
have been adapting the hijab into an Islamic fashion 
that can be appealing while retaining its original goal 
of religious modesty. 
Non-Islamic Iranian culture has been consistently 
marginalized because of the regime’s ideological 
proclivity toward Shi’a Islam. But here too there is 
much unexploited potential, which could help create 
sources of soft power that could prove attractive and 
58  Rooz-e Vaghe’eh (The Day of the Event). Dir. Shahram Asadi. 
Screenplay by Bahram Bayzai. Hedayat Film, 1994. Film.
59  Hossein Alizadeh, Ney-Nava. Mahoor Publication, 1983. Cassette.
Page 21
                  NOVEMBER 2013SOft WaR - a NEW EpiSOdE iN thE Old cONflict BEtWEEN iRaN aNd thE UNitEd StatES
counteract U.S. sources of soft power. Iranian classical 
literature, from Ferdowsi to Molana to Khayam, is 
deeply popular at the grass-roots level in Iran and 
even in the West, where artists have interpreted such 
works for modern audiences. But in Iran itself not 
only is there little state support for promoting classical 
culture, it is often treated with suspicion by Iranian 
conservatives. Modern Iranian culture is perhaps even 
more repressed and neglected than classical Iranian 
culture. Giants of modern Iranian literature and poetry 
such as Sadegh Hedayat, Mahmood Dowlatabadi and 
Ahmad Shamloo are not actively promoted as some of 
Iran’s finest cultural products, and it is left to Iranian 
artists and ordinary people to highlight them inside 
Iran and the diaspora. 
Finally, the Islamic Republic’s culture since 1979 
provides a reservoir with great potential to create 
attractive sources of soft power. Take the Iran-Iraq 
War, called the Holy Defense by the regime. The war, 
potentially the most important event in the Islamic 
Republic’s history, has a very important place in 
the regime’s culture as a titanic struggle in which 
the nation paid a tremendous price in blood and 
treasure to defend itself against hostile foreign forces 
bent on its destruction. Today, however, the war is 
commemorated in much the same way it was during 
the 1980s and 1990s, making it more difficult for 
the younger generation to relate to it. Holy Defense 
Cinema, a sub-genre of film in Iran dealing with the 
war and its aftermath, today produces films that are 
formulaic and ideological in their portrayal of the 
war effort and come off as propaganda. Religious 
filmmaker Morteza Aviny’s classic documentary 
on Iranian soldiers on the frontlines of the war, 
Narrative of Conquest, is a great example of a work 
that was well received during its heyday more than 
two decades ago but has lost much of its appeal due 
to overuse by the regime and the inter-generational 
disconnect in Iran.60
However, there are exceptions, such as Passion for 
Flight,61 the popular Iranian television series about the 
60  Ravayat-e Fath (Narrative of Conquest). Dir. Morteza Aviny. IRIB 
1, Aviny. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
61  Passion for Flight (Shogh-e Parvaz). Dir. Yadollah Samadi. IRIB 1, 
2007-2011. Film.
U.S.-trained F-14 Tomcat fighter pilot and martyred 
war hero Abbas Baba’i, and Attack on H3,62 a war 
film about the spectacular Iranian air force operation 
against an Iraqi military base during the war. The 
work of film director Ebrahim Hatamikia can also be 
placed in this category, and the impediments placed 
before him by the regime are emblematic of the 
latter’s self-defeating approach to culture. An Iran-
Iraq War veteran and highly regarded filmmaker who 
has specialized in Holy Defense Cinema, Hatamikia 
has nonetheless faced numerous obstacles, such 
as censorship from the Ministry of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance, and has not received systematic 
support to leverage his talent. The United States, 
in contrast, has become quite adept at exploiting 
the attractive cultural potential of its military and 
conflicts around the globe. The U.S. Department of 
Defense’s relationship with the American film and 
television industry has produced many movies and 
shows that lionize the U.S. military and contextualize 
and promote U.S. foreign policy. Special operations 
forces-themed television shows such as The Unit or 
films such as Zero Dark Thirty are great illustrations 
of this, helping create a culture that reinforces the 
high social status of U.S. military personnel and their 
mission. 
Likewise, many of the regime’s political ideals date 
back to the first decade after the revolution and have 
lost much of their potency over the years. The theory 
of the Guardianship of the Jurist is a case in point. 
Conceived of as a divinely and popularly ordained 
form of government and enthusiastically supported 
by Iranians in 1979, this political ideal has become 
less responsive to the popular will, resembling more 
a form of sacred kingship. Yet here too innovative 
clerical religious thinkers such as late Grand 
Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri have proposed 
ways of renovating this political ideal, which 
maintains much of its content while allowing greater 
popular participation. Montazeri’s interpretation of 
the Guardianship of the Jurist sees its legitimacy as 
coming through election by the people (entekhab). Yet 
62  Attack On H-3 (Hamleh Be H-3). Dir. Shahriar Bahrani. Sureh 
Cinema, 1994. Film.
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rather than seize on political ideals with the potential 
to attract, the regime has responded by empowering 
political ideals that move in the opposite direction, 
such those espoused by Ayatollah Mohammad-
Taghi Mesbah-Yazdi. He has argued for a version 
of Guardianship of the Jurist whose legitimacy is 
derived from God, in other words “installation” 
(entesab) by the Shi’a clergy acting as intermediaries 
for God. In this version of Guardianship of the Jurist 
the people have little say.63 
Policies are another source of soft power in which 
the Islamic Republic has had a serious deficit in the 
post-war era, not only because regime policies often 
ignore the pulse of society but also because existing 
policies have been riddled with failures. Let us look 
at this in the context of the social, political and 
economic spheres. In the social sphere the policy of 
the regime has been to crack down on the impulse 
of Iranian youth toward greater social freedom. 
Iranian conservatives today interfere extensively 
in the people’s social lives. The regime continues 
to expend considerable energy carrying out raids 
by police and other security forces on individuals 
whom it deems inappropriately dressed. Or take the 
regime’s 2012 decision to place limits on women’s 
entry to universities and eliminate them from certain 
majors altogether at some universities. In a world 
in which the general trend for women appears to be 
towards greater emancipation, this policy seeks to 
limit the place of women in society, the economy and 
politics. Policy shortcomings in the political sphere 
have already been noted above, but are elaborated 
upon here. The revolution of 1979 took place in part 
as a reaction to the Shah Mohammad-Reza’s closing 
of the political space—he de jure turned the country 
into a single-party state—at a time when society had 
become intensely politically conscious. Today, Iran’s 
political system often also looks to be moving in the 
direction of greater exclusion, even of some of its 
own elites, despite an ever greater clamor by youth 
to become engaged in politics. 
The Islamic Republic’s greatest shortcoming, 
however, has perhaps been in the economic realm, 
despite Iran’s endowment with substantial natural 
63  Davood Feirahi, Nezam-e Siasi Va Dolat Dar Islam (political 
Regime and Government in Islam) (Tehran: SAMT, 2007): 275-87.
and human resources. Successful economic policies 
that benefit people can be a great source of soft power. 
Take Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s famous 
“Income-Doubling Plan” of 1960, which not only 
promised economic growth but actually translated 
this into tangible benefits for ordinary people. 
Likewise the Communist Party of China (CPC) has 
based a good deal of its legitimacy and appeal to 
the world in the last two decades on its success in 
generating economic growth. Iranian policies like 
the “Targeted Subsidy Plan” (tarh-e hadafmanidiy-e 
yaraneha), which sought to remove subsidies that had 
become a great source of inefficiency in the Iranian 
economy, could have been packaged as part of a 
larger and more coherent economic plan that would 
have stimulated growth and benefited citizens.64 But 
political infighting has mangled implementation 
of the plan, and it is now perceived as contributing 
to inflation. Policies as a source of soft power can 
be very attractive when they resonate with political 
ideals, society’s needs and are successful. Policies in 
the Islamic Republic often seem to do none of the 
above.
Finally, the Islamic Republic has also been unable to 
leverage institutions as a source of soft power. The 
regime may not be in a position to create or utilize 
global institutions to set the international agenda 
the way the United States does. However, it can use 
smaller-scale and local institutions to at least take 
the initiative in setting the agenda within Iran and 
perhaps even the region, especially through centers of 
knowledge production such as universities, research 
centers and policy think-tanks. The circumstances 
for this do not yet exist in Iran. Centers of knowledge 
production, especially universities, live under a 
cloud of repression that stunts creativity and prevents 
Iranian knowledge producers (students, professors, 
researchers, etc.) from interacting with peers around 
the globe and disseminating their ideas. As noted 
earlier, much of Iran’s academic talent also goes 
abroad due to poor conditions in Iran. Interestingly, 
the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), headed by 
Hassan Rouhani just prior to his election as president 
64   Dominique Guillaume, et al. “Iran - The Chronicles of the Subsidy 
Reform.” International Monetary Fund. 1 July 2011. Online. 3 July 
2013.
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in June 2013, may be an important milestone in terms 
of creating agenda-setting institutions as sources of 
soft power and its work is likely to greatly inform the 
Rouhani administration. 
The Islamic Republic’s current, de facto, soft war 
strategy appears to be having mixed results. The use 
of hard responses has enabled the regime to limit 
the diffusion of U.S. primary currencies in Iran. If 
carried to its extreme, including cutting Iranians 
off from the Internet, this may be successful in 
reducing Iranians’ exposure to U.S. sources of soft 
power. The regime’s inability to generate attractive 
sources of soft power, however—which appears to 
be a consequence of neglect rather than of failed 
policy—is a fatal flaw in its strategy. Iranians are 
not flocking to the regime; they are going abroad or 
into their own private realms. To address this critical 
shortcoming, the Islamic Republic would need to 
strengthen its economy and, more importantly, allow 
greater social, political and cultural freedoms—as 
in the countries able to produce attractive sources 
of soft power. As things stand, Iranians, particularly 
youth, are susceptible to U.S. sources of soft power 
and in many instances are becoming alienated from 
the regime. This does not bode well for the regime’s 
future.  
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CONCLUSION
Soft war is a conflict rooted in Iran’s encounter with 
Western imperialism from the 19th century onward, 
and more specifically in the Islamic Republic’s 
geopolitical conflict with the United States since 
1979. It is the expression of two interwoven strands of 
the regime’s, and specifically Iranian conservatives,’ 
DNA: Islamic nativism and anti-Americanism. For 
a regime that claims an authentic Islamic identity, 
rejects the influence of the United States, and has 
the ambition to control much of its citizens’ social, 
political, and cultural lives, the exercise of U.S. soft 
power poses security challenges. Iranians attracted to 
U.S. primary currencies can internalize their values, 
thereby often simultaneously rejecting the values 
of the regime. The divergence between regime and 
society—strongly exacerbated by U.S. soft power—
is not an abstract concern, but one that can manifest 
itself in the form of concrete security challenges, 
forcing the regime to respond. 
As we have argued, however, the Islamic Republic’s 
soft war strategy is flawed, particularly in its ability 
to create attractive indigenous sources of soft power. 
This has led to a soft power deficit vis-à-vis the United 
States. By focusing on a hard response, the regime 
can limit the diffusion of U.S. primary currencies in 
Iran. But this is not a real solution, because it does 
not address the root cause of why U.S. primary 
currencies have had such attractive power in Iran: 
the relative unattractiveness of the regime’s own 
primary currencies. Economic failure is one pillar of 
this deficit. More important, however, is the regime’s 
repression of civil society, particularly the artistic 
and intellectual elites, who are often the creators of 
attractive sources of soft power. These sources cannot 
be mechanically produced by throwing money at 
them, but require the participation of civil society to 
come about. The Islamic Republic’s current soft war 
strategy, though not a total defeat, is not a path to 
victory. 
Still, this state of affairs cannot be taken for granted, 
and at least two factors in the immediate future 
could change this trajectory. One important factor 
could be the election of Rouhani as president of the 
Islamic Republic and the re-orientation of social, 
cultural, and policies that could result. Rouhani’s 
election campaign was in part premised on softening 
certain aspects of recent Iranian government policy, 
corresponding to the hard response discussed above, 
while strengthening social, political, cultural, and 
other freedoms, corresponding to the soft response. 
If Rouhani fulfills these campaign promises, Iran 
will be in a much better position to create attractive 
sources of soft power. Another factor may be the 
impact of U.S. economic sanctions on Iran. President 
Barack Obama and the U.S. Congress, like U.S. 
leaders before them, have claimed that the sanctions 
and other policies that seek to pressure Iran are not 
targeted at the Iranian people. But ordinary Iranians 
are the ones suffering the most from the ways in 
which sanctions have seriously exacerbated the 
Iranian economy’s existing problems. These impacts 
are reaching most levels of peoples’ lives, affecting 
food prices, access to medicines, ability to travel and 
study abroad, etc. This policy contradicts American 
proclamations of friendship and respect toward 
Iranians because it undeniably and very directly hurts 
ordinary people and becomes a believable bogeyman 
which the regime can exploit. This schizophrenic 
policy, causing pain to what many believe to be 
the most pro-American population in one of the 
most anti-American regions, undermines the 
attractiveness of U.S. sources of soft power in Iran. 
This could alienate a new generation of Iranians, as 
U.S. support for the Pahlavi regime did from 1953 
onward, leading to a new wave of anti-Americanism. 
The United States should consider its current policies 
in light of this and the much longer history it has with 
Iran, minimizing aspects which harm Iranians who 
share much with the American people. After all, it 
is these Iranians, and not the United States’ coercive 
economic and military measures per se, who hold 
out the best hope for a peaceful long-term friendship 
between the two nations and an end to the soft war.
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